Women’s Rights and the Legacy of Lincoln: Explaining the Adoption of Legislative Gender Quotas in the Western Hemisphere

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Even though Abraham Lincoln’s views on women’s rights have not been thoroughly documented, President Lincoln’s legacy is closely connected to the women’s movement in the United States and beyond. First, there are Lincoln’s views on human rights and against slavery in the Confederate States, which were made evident by the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863. Indeed, his position on the liberation of slaves could be interpreted also to support a broader meaning of freedom, as applied to women. In addition, it is within Lincoln’s historical time that the “first wave” feminism became a force to be reckoned with. From North to South America, women in the western hemisphere began to mobilize for justice and equality; and they made critical yet, slow and gradual progress. However, it was not until the beginning of the 20th century and many decades thereafter that women gained the right to vote and the right to enjoy more or less equal civil rights with men in the western hemisphere. Yet, women remained widely underrepresented in politics.

During the 1990s, a growing number of countries made significant efforts to help reduce the gender gap that had been so pervasive for women in politics. Among a number of institutional devices, gender quotas are one of the most popular and effective mechanisms for rapidly increasing the proportion of women in political positions of high-ranking. Gender quotas provide women with a means to secure their participation in legislatures; they have been implemented in developed and developing countries, and have been influenced by both domestic and international phenomena (Crocker, 2007). More particularly, the adoption of legislative gender quotas in Argentina had a snowballing effect in Latin America, when thirteen
other Latin American countries adopted legislative gender quotas in less than a decade. These phenomena were partly driven by the return of democratic governments to the region and partly, as a result of new international trends that pressed for the inclusion of women in politics.

Following a brief discussion on the evolution of the women’s movement in the western hemisphere, starting around Lincoln’s presidency, this paper examines the more recent adoption of gender quota legislation in the Latin American legislatures. This paper will argue that gender quotas were adopted largely as a result of diffusion that included global and regional trends, as well as internal factors, such as the significant role of women legislators, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and executive offices in individual country-adopters. Finally, this paper examines the effectiveness of gender quota legislation in Latin America and the factors that have contributed to either its successful or poor implementation of the laws. Overall, this paper provides fresh insights concerning the dimensions of policy diffusion, and illustrates the effective role of the women’s movement at international, regional and domestic levels in closing the gender gap.

The Women’s Movement: Then and Now

The women’s movement has been traditionally divided into three waves. The first wave starting early in the 19th century, through Lincoln’s presidency and thereafter into the 20th century in the United States, Western Europe and Latin America. The movement had the broad purpose of demanding equal political and civil rights for women, when compared to men. In the United States early leaders of this movement included Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, and Soujourner Truth, who each campaigned for the abolition of slavery prior to championing women's right to vote (Gerda Lerner, 1993). In Latin America Bertha Lutz (Brazil), Paulina Luisi (Uruguay) and Alicia Moreau (Argentina) championed the women’s movement in their respective countries and beyond. In the latter case, both Lutz and Luisi along with Doris Stevens from the United States played a significant role in the creation of the
Inter-American Commission of Women at the Pan-American Union (later the Organization of American States), the first inter-governmental and regional organization for women rights in the world thus, predating the United Nations Commission of Women (Mary Meyer, 1998).

The second wave dating from 1950s~1980s was concerned with women equality in law and in society. Aspects of this movement that ran along the civil rights movement in the United States, Western Europe and Latin America had the broad purpose of ending sex discrimination. The feminist activist and author, Carol Hanisch coined the slogan *The Personal is Political*, which became synonymous with the second wave (Linda Nicholson, 1997). In Latin America, the movement became highly politicized, when many feminist women joined guerrillas or revolutionary movements to liberate their countries from the subjugation inflicted by ruling dictatorships in the region. This was the case of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Montoneros in Argentina, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and of Shining Path’s sympathizers in Peru (Stoltz Chinchilla, 1993).

The Third wave is seen as a continuation of the second wave and a reaction against its failures. In the United States, a focus on the intersection between race and gender remained prominent. In Western Europe the concerns were also cultural and social, but the movement emphasized the inclusion of women in politics through affirmative action. In Latin America, democratic waves that swept the region in the 1980s played a significant role in the emergence and expansion of women’s NGOs that as explained below, among other significant achievements, they led to the introduction of legislative gender quotas throughout the region (Amrita Basu, 2010).

**Gender Quotas and their Merits**

As briefly stated above, during the 80s and 90s a growing world consensus among non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations, prompted women to press for gender friendly legislation that would help reduce the gender gap. (ECLAC, 1998). Those changes have been primarily directed to the state as an agent capable of implementing reforms (Atria, 1995). Among a number of institutional devices, one of the most effective mechanisms for rapidly increasing the election of women in
public posts has been the adoption of gender quotas. Gender quotas have been defined as “institutional mechanisms established to provide women with a means to secure their participation in political public posts where they have been traditionally underrepresented.” (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1997) Nancy Fraser (1997) asserts that gender quotas were not only needed to meet the claims of women, but were also implemented within the broader context of state reform. Fraser observed that the collapse of the old gender order was critical for building “a more modern and progressive society” (23).

Gender quotas have been generally classified into three broad categories; reserved seats, party-level quotas, and legislative quotas (Piatti-Crocker and Kempton, 2008; Krook, 2009). 1 Reserved seats were first introduced in the 1930s but did not become popular until the 2000s (Krook, 2009:6). Reserved seats set aside a certain number of seats in parliament for women. They establish group-specific avenues of representation and circumvent the existing party and electoral systems. That is, instead of being elected by regular procedures, women are either appointed or nominated by the president, the elected parliament, or may be selected in another manner (Krook, 2004; Piatti-Crocker and Kempton, 2008). Reserved seats have become prevalent in a number of African and Middle Eastern countries, such as Rwanda, Uganda, Afghanistan and Pakistan (Quota Project, 2010).

Party-based quota systems appeared first in the 1970s. Party-level quotas are adopted by individual political parties willing to increase the proportion of women candidates in their elective posts. In this type of system, it is up to a given political party to adopt a gender quota. In addition, the percentage of women required by the quota and how these quotas are designed and implemented are left to the decision of a given political party. Party-based quota systems are prevalent in Western Europe, though many other countries in Latin America (such as Chile and Uruguay) Asia (Thailand, Philippines, etc.) and Africa (South Africa, Botswana, among others) have also implemented this type of quotas (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009).

Finally, legislative quotas appeared in the 1990s. This type of quotas mandates all parties presenting candidates for legislative elections to include a certain percentage of women in their candidate party-lists. Legislative quotas have been primarily a Latin American phenomenon. Starting with Argentina in 1991,
quotas spread to twelve other Latin American countries in less than a decade: Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela – though the last two, later revoked the legislation- and more recently, Uruguay adopted a legislative quota. Latin America has been traditionally considered to have a profound male-oriented legacy (machismo) and has generally shown little regard in attempting to close the gender gap. Thus, it is remarkable the fact that many Latin American countries have adopted such progressive legislation for women. Proponents of legislative quotas argue that these “newer” quotas are more effective than others because they involve a blanket mechanism, requiring all political parties to implement a quota regardless of their ideology. These proponents also favor national legislation over party-level quotas because they believe it tends to close the gender gap more rapidly (Quota Project, 2010).

Widespread adoption of gender quotas worldwide seems puzzling since these policies infringe on one of the most widely held assumptions of legislative behavior; the fact that elected officials seek to safeguard their positions (Baldez, 2003: 8). Providing women with a preferential quota may threaten political positions traditionally held by men. Conversely, women account for at least half of the population in most societies and adopting gender quota legislation could benefit the election of the party supporting a gender quota bill. Indeed, in Latin America, public opinion has favored the inclusion of women in political positions of high-ranking. Finally, gender quotas have been regarded as an important component of a real participatory democracy in the region, where gender-based discrimination should be prevented or remedied.

Those opposed to gender quotas have generally based their arguments on the fact that they provide an advantage to women on biological grounds instead of merit. More broadly, opponents to gender quotas claim that such institutional mechanisms threaten principles of liberal democracies because they give women preferential treatment, instead of equality of opportunity. A more proper course of action, these arguments suggest, would require cultural changes within political parties, as men increasingly understand women’s concerns (Bacchi, 2006, Piatti-Crocker and Kempton 2008). Proponents of quotas reply that one can invoke the illiberal nature of quotas only if men and women were equally present in positions of
authority. Accordingly, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights among other organizations, have claimed consistently that affirmative action measures are fully “in compliance with the principle of non-discrimination and the applicable provisions of human rights” (IACW, 2004).

Much more contentious is the argument that quotas produce “second class politicians,” because women are elected on the grounds of their sex instead of their abilities, thus creating a separate (less “qualified”) pool of legislators. The counterargument is that merit itself may be gendered (Dahlerup 2006, Krook 2006, Lovenduski, 2005, Murray, 2010) and if women’s merit is currently undermined, the inclusion of women would precisely serve to expand the pool of talent and diversity driven by quotas. Some recent works have also suggested that once elected in legislatures, women’s parliamentary volume and activity do not seem to differ between “quota” women and other legislators, at least, in the case of France (Murray, 2010). In summary, and despite their legal challenges, gender quota systems are crucial for the creation of a critical mass of women in traditionally male-dominated legislatures.³

According to documented evidence and a number of interviews conducted for this purpose, Argentine women politicians were the main agents of policy innovation in the domestic realm and of policy diffusion to both the country’s provinces and beyond the country’s borders (Lubertino, 2003). Whereas, women politicians in Argentina did not embody a single ideological perspective, they shared a similar interest in advocating the adoption of gender quotas. María José Lubertino asserts that four factors contributed to the gender quota debate in Argentina: first the “feminization” of political women, which by the late 1980s developed into a rather cohesive group with a common understanding of the role of gender in politics; second, contacts with European women—particularly women from Spain and Germany’s Socialist Parties—by using both informal and formal channels of communication; third, the coherent organization of Argentine political women from traditionally rival political parties. Fourth, the emergence of gender quota campaigns at both national and regional levels (Lubertino, 1992: 13). In addition, this more women-friendly environment was influenced by the return of democracy to Argentina in 1983, following seven years of
repression during the dirty war (Crocker, 2005) and by Argentina becoming a party to the Convention on the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1985. 4

Legislative Gender Quotas: Argentina and Beyond

Even though the Partido Justicialista (PJ) had already experimented with gender quotas in Argentina during the early 1950s, only about four percent of the country’s legislators in the lower chamber were women prior to 1991. The debate on gender quotas in Argentina emerged around 1985, first at party-level, within the two largest political parties in the country- the Radical Civic Union (UCR), and the Justicialist( PJ) Parties-and starting in 1988 at the national level and across political parties (Lubertino, 2003) . Further, the number of women activists who were involved in the quota campaign was negligible compared to the number of women participating as candidates, volunteers, or occupying political posts within the parties. Yet, in measuring how influential a small group of women may be in producing radical change, the size of the group may not carry as much weight as the positions they occupy. Gender quota campaigners were leaders of influential bureaucracies, members of the national parliament, women councils in the city of Buenos Aires, or positioned in political posts of high ranking (Lipsciz,2003).5

Significant legal precedents on behalf of quotas were the Western European experiences with quotas, particularly the Spanish and German cases of party-level quotas. In both countries their socialist parties had implemented quota legislation in the 1980s and through NGOs and regular communication between these parties and Argentine quota campaigners; the debate on gender quota adoption was brought to Argentina.6 Maria Rigat Pflaum-president of the Women’s Bureau of the Ebert Foundation in Argentina-claimed that before the gender quota law was introduced to the Argentine Senate, the Ebert Foundation drew on the experience of quotas in Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SDP) and sponsored seminars and assemblies in the country’s provinces (Rigat-Pflaum, 2003). The organization also published two booklets explaining the experiences with party-level gender quotas in Germany and Spain (Fundacion Ebert, 1990 and 1991).
However, Argentina adopted legislative quotas, rather than party-level quotas, as is commonly the case in Europe.

On November 6, 1989 Senator Margarita Malharro de Torres of the Unión Cívica Radical Party (UCR) representing the province of Mendoza introduced a gender quota bill in the National Senate. 7 The bill had two requirements: a minimum thirty percent quota for legislative candidates in Argentina’s closed list system and a requirement that a corresponding percentage of women be placed in “winnable” positions (Gallo and Giacobone 2001, 7). On September 20, 1990 Malharro’s bill was adopted by an overwhelming majority, with only two PJ senators opposing it. On November 6, 1991 and this time, backed by an extensive mobilization of women, the bill was adopted in the Chamber of Deputies by a majority of votes and only opposed by the Conservative (UCEDE) and Socialist Movement (MAS) parties. 8 At sub-national levels, the Argentine quota law of 1991 was followed by provincial legislation that established gender quotas similar to the national model. For example, in May 1992, only a few months following the national law, Santa Fé approved its own 30 percent quota law for candidates to the provincial legislature. By 2000, 22 of the 23 provinces and the federal district had adopted gender quota laws (Crocker, 2005).

Following the adoption of legislative quotas, a new battle for women politicians emerged over the law’s enforcement. First, since the law’s placement mandate was rather ambiguous, in 1993 Regulatory Decree 379 incorporated the policy of including at least one woman for every two men candidates in party lists for the elections in the lower house (Gallo and Giacobone 2001, 27). Second, even after the decree was adopted a majority of the candidate lists violated the required placement mandate. During the 1993 elections, when the law was first implemented, only a few of the nationwide 213 lists followed the legal requirements (Durrieu 1998, 120). In addition, there was a shared concern among political women that the quota law could be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court; given that Article 16 of the 1853 Argentine Constitution establishes that all citizens are equal before the law. Hence, the supreme tribunal could interpret affirmative action as endorsing reverse discrimination. Such had been the case in previous rulings by the highest tribunals...
of Italy, France, Costa Rica, and Colombia. Thus, when in 1994 a Constitutional National Assembly gathered to introduce reforms to the 1853 Constitution, the inclusion of an affirmative action clause was one of the key successful demands made by its 80 female members (Crocker, 2007). In its final form, the constitutional reform of 1994 incorporates a clause that guarantees women affirmative action not only in the legislature but also in all “elective and political posts” (Constitución de la Nación Argentina, art. 37).

This (Argentine) constitution seeks to put both sexes on an equal footing in both public and private lives, through positive action in politics and the workplace, and in private life, establishing equality in the exercise of sexual and reproductive rights and in the family. (Lubertino 2003, 32)

Finally, Argentine president Fernando De La Rúa (Alianza Party) used Decree 1,246/2000 to extend the gender quota law to “ all elective posts of deputies, senators, and national constituents” (Gallo and Giacobone 2002, 170). Although placement mandate violations have become less frequent since the new decree was adopted, women politicians still act as watchdogs to prevent legal infringements at both the national and provincial levels. ⁹

After Argentina and in the short period of two years (1996~1998), ten Latin American countries adopted similar legislative quotas, two others did so in 2000 and in 2009, Uruguay introduced a gender quota law. This process lead many scholars to categorize this process as diffusion ( Krook 2006 and 2009, Piaotti-Crocker 2005, 2007, 2008). However, whereas “emulation” is central to diffusion, this does not imply that the “emulating” social group will adopt a given policy in an identical manner. Certainly, some similarity must be present but in many cases, diffusion will experience a process of internal adaptation according to the receiving group’s cultural or institutional circumstances. Rogers (2003,17) calls this adjustment process re-invention and shows that most adopters tend to modify the emulated policy before adopting the innovation. For example, Uruguay’s 2009 law is rather timid in the sense that it is just a temporal policy, unlike the legislation adopted in other Latin American countries. Moreover, this rapid diffusion of legislative quotas in Latin America was a process that involved both external (regional and global
conferences and organizations) and internal forces (national governmental mechanisms, legislators, or other members of government, NGOs, etc) and policies were adapted to fit a given country’s institutional and cultural framework. Yet, as explained below, the external processes played a critical role in shaping internal developments that led to a widespread adoption of legislative quotas in the region.

The Women’s Movement and the Diffusion of Gender Quotas in Latin America

During the 1980s, the women’s movement in Latin America embarked on a process of expansion in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Qualitatively, women’s groups became more aware of the fact that traditional roles have kept them lagging behind men in the public life, including employment opportunities and involvement in key political posts. Maxine Molineux (2001, 180) claims that “those active in the women’s movement followed a course which some participants have described as a shift, albeit hesitant and conditional, from the margins to the center.” Quantitatively and due to a great extent, to a new wave of regional re-democratization, Latin America experienced the emergence of a significant number of interest groups, a process that Molineux citing Sonia Alvarez, describes as the “NGOization” of the Latin American women’s movement (181). In addition, whereas an extensive number of NGOs emphasized development activism instead of egalitarianism, an even greater number of organizations dealt exclusively with women’s rights (Lycklama et. al, 1998).

Some of the women interviewed for this project observed that even though most women’s NGOs rely on very limited budgets, networking among them at national, regional, and global levels became increasingly popular because of the development of communications technology, due to a greater usage of the internet.10 In sum, processes of political opening and democratization developed and offered women a more suitable setting in which an increasing number of women’s organizations at different levels (local, national, and regional) emerged almost spontaneously. A revitalized civil society made room for the
discussion of a variety of women’s demands, particularly regarding political and social gains (Lycklama et al. 1998, 30).

Networking among women appeared to have had a strong impact on the diffusion of gender quotas (Baldez 2004, Beckwith 2003, and Krook 2006). Among some of the relevant organizations, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation held meetings with the purpose of discussing gender quotas in the Southern Cone countries. In 1990, women with liaisons to Ebert from the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, formed the Foro de Mujeres del Cono Sur (Women’s Forum of the Southern Cone), one of the earlier regional women networks that debated the usage of gender quotas in Europe and Latin America. According to a report published by the Ebert Foundation, “the Argentine office created the Women’s Forum for its 20 participants coming from the five Southern Cone countries in Latin America, all of them very involved in politics” (Ebert 2002, 10). This organization began meeting annually in 1991 “and established since then, strong contacts among its participants through whom experiences are shared” (Ebert 2002, 11). The report also suggests that the Forum’s discussions focused on “questions related to equality of opportunities, integration with Mercosur, and legislation over gender quotas….” (Ebert 2002, 12).

Extending the discussion on quotas to other Latin American countries beyond the Southern Cone, the Women’s Commission of the Latin American Parliament (Parlatino) was an important source of regional socialization. Citing the Brazilian legislator Marta Suplicy, Htun and Jones (2002, 34) claim that “Latin American legislators gathered at Parlatino in São Paolo to consider the experience in Argentina.” Franganillo (2003) asserts that “representatives from the PARLATINO gathered from all over Latin America to participate at regional meetings.” Marcela Durrieu (2003) and Cecilia Lipsciz (2003) shared with the author similar claims.  

Of particular interest was a 1994 conference organized by Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in Mar del Plata, Argentina to prepare for the 1995 World Conference in Beijing at which the Commission of Women and Development (Unidad Mujer y
Desarrollo) endorsed gender quota legislation.\textsuperscript{12} Although the report does not mention explicitly the Argentine experience with its gender quota law, the document identifies the new policy trend when it asserts that “some countries have been implementing mechanisms of affirmative action …through specific measures” (ECLAC 1994). In addition, a panel of Argentine women in Mar del Plata discussed the country’s experience with its national gender quota legislation at the conference and also at other informal settings such as restaurants or coffee bars, where the subject was brought up by interested Latin American feminists (Franganillo 2003, Lipsicz 2003). Finally, women who had been involved in quota campaigns in Argentina were invited by NGOs, such as WEDO and the Women’s Leadership Program (PROLEAD), and IGOs, such as the Inter-American Bank of Development (IBD) to share their experiences with quotas in Argentina.\textsuperscript{13}

Yet, the regional mobilization was the result, to a great extent, of a global U.N.-sponsored agenda. More particularly, the 1995 Fourth World Women’s Conference in Beijing was crucial in the diffusion of legislative quotas in Latin America in three main instances. First, during the pre-conference period, when a number of regional conferences organized by both IGOS and NGOs set the agenda and prepared proposals to be presented at the UN conference.\textsuperscript{14} Second, during the conference itself, which “legitimized the idea of gender quotas” (Htun and Jones 2002). Indeed, “the resulting Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, signed unanimously by all 189 states participating at the conference, called on governments to take measures to ensure women’s equal access and full participation in power structures and decision-making, as well as to increase women’s capacity to participate in decision-making leadership” (Krook 2009, 3). More specifically, the conference provided crucial momentum for the diffusion of gender quotas across the region (Camacho Granados, 1997; Htun and Jones 2002; Krook 2006). The National Document (Informe Nacional) presented by Argentina, included a report on the country’s national and provincial-levels legislative quotas.\textsuperscript{15} Finally, the process of diffusion was also shaped by the post-Beijing period, when organizations within the U.N. system sponsored the implementation and follow-up of gender-
based policies. It recommended that governments prepare national plans for action by 1996, outlining implementation strategies in consultation with major institutions and civil society organizations. It is noteworthy that most of the Latin American countries adopting legislative quotas did so within two years following the Beijing conference. This is another indicator of the U.N.’s influential role.

Other sources appear to confirm that cross-national socialization such as conferences, meetings, and organizations played a very significant role in the diffusion of gender quota laws in Latin America. For example, in Honduras, Ménendez and Montesdeoca (2002, 18) observe that women legislators gathered the necessary documentation and experiences abroad--particularly from Argentina, but later from Peru and Costa Rica--through meetings and conferences to submit a proposal in Honduras’ legislature in 1998. In Costa Rica, the Argentine gender quota legislation was an important precedent for the country’s 1996 law. In addition, Juliana Martinez a member of the feminist foundation Acceso of Costa Rica claims that the 1993 executive decree enacted in Argentina served as a model when Costa Rican women decided to include a similar placement mandate in their legislation (e-mail correspondence: October 11, 2004).

According to an alternative explanation, the adoption of mandatory gender quotas throughout Latin America was not the result of diffusion but instead a consequence of parallel developments and shared preferences. However, this alternative explanation seems inadequate for two reasons. First, the lapse of time between the innovator (Argentina) and the other Latin American countries was too great. Second, even if there might have been some discussion regarding gender quotas in other countries, there was no concrete action (i.e. adoption of new policy) before or concurrent with the Argentine national legislation, contradicting the logic of parallel development.

There was certainly a significant time period between the passage of the quota law in Argentina and the adoption of similar legislation in other Latin American countries. Following Argentina, the next countries to adopt similar gender quota legislation did so five years later. Even
an earlier experience with gender quotas in Costa Rica does not contradict this thesis. In fact, in 1988 Costa Rica sought to introduce gender quotas but was not successful. The eventual passage of the Law of Real Equality (1990) included a requirement that political parties adopt measures to increase women’s election (Jones 2004), but as it will be discussed later in the paper, it was not until 1996 and following several attempts that a gender quota law was finally adopted in Costa Rica (García Quesada 2003). Most Latin American countries adopted gender quota legislation between 1996 and 1998, and two in 2000. Certainly, much of the scholarship related to diffusion finds time to be an essential variable because the passage of time (at least initially) increases the likelihood of diffusion (Berry and Berry, 1990, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2001, Mintrom 2000, Mintrom and Vergari 1998, Mooney 2001, Starr 1991).

Although there was some discussion regarding gender quotas in other Latin American countries even before the passage of the Argentine gender quota law, this discourse is best categorized as “pre-diffusion” or, as Kingdon suggests, a situation in which there is some degree of internal political debate but no concrete action. In this case, there was some discussion supporting gender quota legislation in selected Latin American countries and during several regional meetings, yet none of the countries adopted the legislation.18

Overall, the regional and global developments of the mid-1990s, particularly the pre- and post-Beijing processes, were crucial in stimulating debate over gender quotas, which intensified from a mere ideological aspiration to a real phenomenon. Through networking, women had the opportunity to discuss their experiences with gender quotas at regional and global conferences and adopt key resolutions that pressured national governments to modify policy and behavior in favor of women.

Table 1: Legislative Gender Quotas in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Law 24,012 (30 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Law Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Reform and Completion of the Electoral System Act (30 percent). A constitutional reform will include a parity law for the next legislative elections.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brasil</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Law 9,504 (originally quota of 20 percent, expanded to 30 percent in the year 2000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Law 581 was later overturned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Law 7653 (quota for parties and Assembly delegations, 40 percent). Parity law (50%) will be implemented in 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Labor Protection Act (20 percent). Reformed in 2000: 30 percent of candidates on electoral lists must be women, both for ordinary and supplementary seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades (30 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Méjico</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Amendment to the Federal Code on Electoral Procedures and Institutions (30 percent). Modified in 2002 no more than 70 percent of seats to candidates from one gender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>30 percent for internal and general elections.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Law 834 Electoral Code (20 percent).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perú</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Law 26,859 for national elections (25 percent). Law 26,864 for municipal elections (25 percent). In 2000, gender quotas were raised to 30 percent. At national, regional, municipal levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>30 percent minimum quota for both genders. The quota will be implemented for the time during the 2014 national elections.</td>
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*Data from ECLAC, 2010 and IDEA’s Quota Project, 2010.

The Impact of Gender Quota Legislation in Latin America

As should be expected, countries with legislative quotas have been generally successful in increasing the proportion of women legislators. One of the clearest examples of such success is Argentina. From 1993 (when the quota was first implemented) to 2001, there was an increase of seventeen percent of women legislators in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. During the same period of time, the percentage of women legislators in the Senate increased by thirty percent. Between 2001 and the 2007 legislative elections, the percentage of women in the Chamber of Deputies increased by
eleven percent, and by nine percent in the Senate during the same time-period. Currently, the percentage of women legislators in Argentina exceeds the minimum 30 percent quota in both chambers.

In Costa Rica, “the largest gain (in the percentage of women elected to Congress) was achieved by the adoption of quotas…” but “the percentage of women legislators only reached (and actually surpassed) the minimum quotas threshold of 40 percent with the addition of a placement mandate” during the 2002 elections (Jones, 2004). Costa Rica adopted recently a gender parity clause, by which a 50 percent quota, with strict alternation on lists also known as the “zipper system” will be enforced next during the 2014 national elections (Electoral Code, Article 2 & 52).

Finally, in 2001 Bolivia approved a new electoral system of Mixed Member PR for its Lower House and introduced a placement mandate of one woman for every three candidates but only in the PR election. In the uninominal plurality districts women still remain widely unrepresented. Following the reform of its Constitution in 2009, a parity-clause was introduced in its article nine, by which women and men should alternate candidate seats. However, during the last senate elections, the process was still governed by a temporary law and did not fully incorporate the new constitutional clause in the area of gender equality. Therefore, an umbrella organization that linked a number of women’s groups mobilized with the slogan, “Women Ready for the Ballot, Women Protagonists.”

The effective women’s campaign and the support of President Evo Morales led to a gender parity temporary mechanism that required an equal number of men and women in all parties presenting candidate lists for the election of senators. This measure contributed to an increase in the proportion of women elected to the Bolivian Senate from 3.7 percent (after the 2005 elections) to 47 percent of senators in 2009 (Quota Project, 2010).

As seen on the tables below and despite an increasing percentage of women in all the national legislatures where quotas have been introduced, some quotas have been more effective than others. Leading scholarship on quotas has debated over the factors that influence more positively the election of women, such as the type of electoral system (Matland and Studlar, 1996; Schmidt and Saunders, 2004); district and
party magnitude (Norris, 2004; Jones, 2004); effective quotas and relative magnitude of largest party (Gallo, Sample, and Schmidt 2008) and whether placement mandates are incorporated (Jones, 1998; Krook, 2009). Going beyond this scholarship, Krook (2009,39) asserts that whereas “details of individual provisions shape implementation… measures that appear similar sometimes have distinct effects on women’s representation- and at the same time provisions that seem dissimilar have comparable results.” Krook notes that specific quota campaigns interact with “numerous existing institutional measures” and emphasizes the importance on how those campaigns intersect with the reform or non-reform of other institutions (54-55). The author notes that when quota campaigns mutually reinforce other institutions (harmonizing sequences) they are expected to experience a dramatic success; such that they “fit together over time” as they “complement institutional reform with institutional configurational change.” On the other hand, under disjointed sequences “quota campaigns clash with institutions, they produce conflicts and tensions that undermine efforts to promote change” (210). Krook shows that Argentina’s successful implementation of legislative quotas was due to its quota campaigns’ “harmonizing” sequences.  

Finally, and despite the gender quota “wave” that spread to Latin America quite rapidly and effectively during the 1990s, there seems to be another, less auspicious trend in the region. Since the turn of the century, efforts at both regional and domestic levels have been only sufficient to adopt legislative quotas in Uruguay—which introduced a very modest temporary law- and two of the thirteen original cases (Colombia and Venezuela) have rejected the legislation. Indeed, following reputable scholarship on diffusion, it seems very unlikely that a gender quota wave of the kind experienced in the 1990s will regain strength any time soon in Latin America.
Conclusion

This paper was intended to cover a broader aspect of Lincoln’s legacy in contemporary politics. It attempted to shed light on the diffusion of legislative gender quotas in the 1990s, a process driven by the efforts of the women’s movement that with different purposes and goals dates back to the mid-19th century and has been struggling to close the gender gap ever since.

This paper claimed that the adoption of legislation in Argentina in 1991 initiated a trend at

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1 Data from Inter-Parliamentary Union retrieved on May 25, 2010 from http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm

*No Data Available for Colombia (Lower and Upper Houses) and the Dominican Republic (Upper House).
cross-national levels. Although political parties in many European countries and the PJ in Argentina had adopted gender quotas earlier and some regional debate was evident at the time, the mandatory countrywide legislation adopted in 1991 by Argentina was the first of its kind. The adoption of the Argentine gender quota legislation in 1991 was precisely the “take-off point” for the sort of “bandwagon effect” (John Kingdon 1995). It gave rise to a gender quota movement in the region that was successful in passing similar legislation in thirteen other Latin American countries.

The diffusion process was instigated by transnational organizations and conferences, where women discussed the need to implement gender quota laws in their countries and Argentine politicians were invited to share the country’s experiences with the innovative legislation. In addition, various domestic factors, including the demands of feminist organizations, women legislators, and women’s governmental organizations among others, were critical in shaping the internal processes. Most country-adopters re-invented gender quota policies to fit their institutional and cultural frameworks. Yet, despite an increasing percentage of women in all country-adopters, legislative quotas have been more effective in some cases than in others due to particular institutional mechanisms or other factors.

Overall, this paper attempted to overcome the analytical dichotomy between what occurs within a state (the domestic realm) and what occurs outside of it (the international realm). Certainly, such an integrative methodology has helped analyze more adequately the factors that led to a recent feminist wave and the product of hundreds of years of struggling for equality and justice between the sexes.

ENDNOTES

1 There are several other categorizations of gender quotas (see for example, Dahlerup, 2007, Matland, 2006) but I retained the three categories of reserved seats, party-level, and legislative quotas for this book (See also Krook 2009, who uses this classification as well). Some scholars have suggested that reserved seats are not gender quotas per se, because these mechanisms do not influence candidate nomination processes but instead, make specific provisions as who may gain a seat in parliament (Dahlerup, 2006a).

2 In fact, a survey of around 2000 Latin American citizens, in six major cities- Buenos Aires, Sao Paolo, Rio de Janeiro, Bogota, Colombia, Mexico city, San Salvador- conducted by Gallop on behalf of the Inter American Bank of Development (IBD)
demonstrated that a majority believed that women can make better leaders and produce better governments than men. For a full report on the Gallup poll, please see the Inter-American Dialogue website available at: www.thedialogue.org.

Critical mass theories are quite controversial. Some scholars argue that critical mass puts a burden on female legislators, who feel the pressure to legislate on behalf of women (Trimble, 2006). Others argue that critical mass alone does not guarantee legislation in favor of women, since other intervening factors play a major role (Childs and Krook, 2006; Dahlerup, 2006).

As women’s movements under the law expanded advocating global standards, CEDAW served the important function of increasing the legitimization of women’s demands. By accepting the convention, states commit themselves to undertake a series of measures to end discrimination against women, including legislation and temporary special measures, so that women can enjoy all their human rights and fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, countries that have ratified or acceded to the convention are legally bound to put its provisions into practice and the country is committed to submit national reports, at least every four years, by which it must present the measures taken by the government in compliance with treaty obligations. In addition, in the latter period of global democratization trends, the convention was to serve as the basis of constitutional development for all signatory states (Ellen Dorsey. “The Global Women’s Movement,” pp. 335-360, edited by Paul Diehl, the Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World. Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1997). Apart from becoming a party to the Convention in the mid 1980s, Argentina mentioned in various reports following regional women conferences that CEDAW was one of the country’s primary legal sources for the adoption of legislative quotas in the country. For more information on this topic see Adriana Piatti-Crocker (2010). “Constructing Policy Innovation in Argentina: From Gender Quotas to Same-Sex Marriage.” In Same-Sex Marriage in the Americas: Policy Innovation for Same-Sex Relationships. Jason Pierceson, Adriana Piatti-Crocker and Shawn Schulenberg ed. Lexington Books: Boulder, Co.

Even though there is not a clear number of “norm entrepreneurs” participating in the debate and pressing for policy change, those interviewed for this project revealed to the author that those women initially involved in the process “were the few and always the same ones.” (Interviews with Maria Jose Lubertino May 13, 2003; Virginia Franganillo, May 30, 2003; Monique Aschtul and Maria Luisa Storani May 21, 2003; Cecilia Lipsicz May 27, 2003; Maria Rigat May 23, 2003; and Marcela Rodriguez June 4, 2003). Yet, the proportion of women actively participating in political parties at lower levels was almost half of all members in Argentina at the time when gender quotas were being debated (Lubertino, 2003).

One of such meetings in Paraguay was attended by political women of the Partido Febrerista (Paraguay), Frente Amplio (Uruguay), Worker’s Party (PT) Brazil, the UCR and Popular Socialist Party (PSP) from Argentina, and representatives of the left from Chile, among others.

On November 16, deputies Allegrone de Fonte, Gómez Miranda, Botella, Fernández de Quarrancino, Macedo de Gómez, and Mojardín introduced an alternative bill that included gender-neutral quotas. Under the terms of the second bill no list of candidates for the chamber could include more than 70 percent candidates of the same gender. It also incorporated a placement mandate (Gallo & Giacobone, 2001, p. 7). This bill was defeated in favor of Malharro’s less radical legislation.

Interestingly, the representatives of both the Conservative (UCEDE) and Socialist (MAS) parties, who may be placed ideologically in opposite extremes, argued against the bill along similar philosophical lines: that affirmative action would promote reverse discrimination and violate the Argentine Constitution (Chamber of Deputies, National Debate, in Gallo and Giacobone, 2001).

Under the 1993 executive decree, Menem created the Cabinet of Women’s Councils. The Cabinet was composed of eight women with liaisons to the CNM and was primarily in charge of enforcing the gender quota legislation. Political opposition claimed that the cabinet was biased because its eight members were all PJ women (Amado, 1993).

In order to assess the relative significance of the various conferences and organizations during the “socialization” process, forty-four Argentine women were interviewed, including legislators, women holding high-ranking positions in governmental organizations at the provincial and national levels, national and provincial legislators, and the largest non-governmental organizations in the country. This project used key informants who guided the researcher towards people and organizations for interviews. The research also used archival documentation, papers, and e-mail communications to contact Latin American women outside of Argentina to determine whether the Argentine experience did in fact play a role in the adoption of gender quotas across the region.

For example, the organization’s 1996 report advocated the use of affirmative action for women to secure “equality of results” between genders in Latin American and Caribbean countries (ECLAC, Women and Development Unit, 1996).
In an interview with the author, Maria José Lubertino claimed that she was invited to New York and the Philippines to talk about the Argentine experience. Moreover, PROLEAD organized a conference in Mexico and one of the main topics of debate at the conference was the Argentine experience with gender quotas (Interview with Lubertino: May 13, 2003). In an interview with the author, Marcela Durrieu revealed that she was invited by the Inter-American Bank of Development (IBD) in early 1992 at a conference in Guadalajara, Mexico to explain the innovative Argentine gender policy. In addition, Durrieu asserted that Liliana Gurdulich, the Argentine representative to the Division of the Advancement of Women (DAW) spoke frequently at DAW meetings about the Argentine experience with its gender quota (interview: June 6, 2003).

Mona Krook (2006) argues that while “international documents and meetings serve as catalysts by introducing or popularizing new ideas...most of the “work” in these campaigns is done by domestic actors who organize both nationally and regionally, often, but not always in the run-up to international women’s conferences.” See also Alvarez (2000) and Tripp (2004).

In its Informe Nacional to the 1995 Beijing conference of Women, Argentina presented a 159-page study that included general data concerning women, the establishment of national and provincial mechanisms to promote women’s integration in society on an equal basis with men, the creation of NGOs with similar objectives, and the adoption of legislation and constitutional provisions, including affirmative action. The report’s Chapter Three deals more particularly with the adoption of the gender quota law and its effects at the national level. Accordingly, the informe asserts that the implementation of a 30 percent quota for national legislative candidates had opened up a new debate in the chamber around gender and other social questions that had not been previously part of the national legislative agenda (Consejo Nacional de La Mujer, 1995).

In addition, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) requested governments to submit national action plans for review by the Commission on the Status of Women beginning in March 1997 (UNIFEM, 2001).

In Vargas’ (1998) view, the most important innovations at the Beijing conference were the call “for mainstreaming a gender perspective in all forms of policy-making.” In addition, the mechanisms created by this conference to “follow up” and assess the “mapping progress” were critical in establishing an international framework that explicitly advocated gender equality legislation (Interview with Marcela Rodriguez: June 4, 2004).

See Rogers quote on this chapter (p. 2-3)

The pass of time seems to have benefited the election of women in the lower houses as seen in the table below. All eleven countries still enforcing gender quota legislation have increased the percentage of women in successive elections, though in some cases only slightly. A more modest increase of women senators may be also due to less favorable electoral rules.

As interpreted by extensive scholarship (Jones 1996, 2004, 2005; Htun and Jones 2002; Matland and Studlar 1996; Matland 2002; Rule 1994; Schmidt 2004), the type of electoral system is one of the determining factors of whether a given gender quota legislation will be more or less effective. Whereas, proportional representation, high district and party magnitudes, and placement mandate mechanisms seem to influence the implementation of quotas more favorably, there is controversy on whether closed list systems are more beneficial than open lists. For example, in 1997 Peru had only eleven percent of women in its Congress of the Republic (Congreso de La República) before the law was adopted, but by 2005 there were 29.7 percent of women in Peru’s unicameral congress despite having a PR open list system (Schmidt, 2004).

In her book, Quotas for Women in Politics (2009), Krook discusses the cases of Argentina and France, both adopting legislative quotas but more effectively implemented in Argentina than in France. The author argues that in Argentina quotas were enforced more adequately due to “harmonizing consequences,” whereas France’s “disjointed sequences” led to the more unsuccessful implementation of the law. Further research should help shed light on whether harmonizing vs. disjointed sequences also played a role in Latin America, aside from Argentina.

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